on two largely distinct matters. The first relates to our capacity to achieve an adequate increase in the volume of our exports. The second relates to America's capacity to accept goods and services from the rest of the world on a scale adequate to secure a reasonable equilibrium in her overall balance of payments. Both these issues relate to the position of ourselves and of the United States respectively in relation to the rest of the world taken as a whole. On the assumption, however, that the International Monetary Fund and other supporting arrangements will be successful in establishing multilateral clearing of current transactions over a wide area, bilateral equilibrium will be achieved between the United Kingdom and the United States, if the two conditions are fulfilled that British exports of goods and services to the rest of the world as a whole reach an appropriate level and that American imports of goods and services from the rest of the world as a whole reach an appropriate level. If these conditions are satisfied, there will be no necessity for a strictly bilateral balance between the two countries taken in isolation.
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[JUNE involves an a priori, not a statistical, argument-, which would lead us on to the question just what difference in such circumstances the proposed financial and economic agreements would make. I am limiting myself here to the statistical evidence and to conclusions purporting to be based on it.
Perhaps the most mistaken and most prevalent delusion relates, however, to the creditor position of the United States to-day in relation to the rest of the world. It is commonly believed that the end of the war has left the United States in a strong creditor position, in addition to her large gold reserves. How many people are aware that apart from her gold holdings, which do not, of course, represent an undischarged claim on the rest of the world, the United States was a debtor country on balance at the end of 1945 ? The details are as follows 
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After she entered the war, the net short-term position of the United States deteriorated substantially; so much so that by October 1945 she had dissipated by far the greater part of her large gains from ourselves and others in 1939, 1940 and 1941 before she entered the war, and was only very slightly stronger, after deducting her increased foreign liability from her increased gold reserve, than at the end of 1938, an increase of $5,524 million in gold holdings and of about $200 million in currency holdings abroad being offset by an increase of $5,175 million in foreign liabilities, as is shown in Tables III and IV. Gold held under ear-mark for foreign account at December 31, 1945, represented $3,994 million.
The fact that the U.S. Administration blocked the resources of a number of foreign countries during the war, and that these assets remained blocked throughout the war-period, has made available fairly accurate statistics of the very large dollar holdings of the countries in question, which stood at the end of the war as follows:- Table II (a) Short-term assets held in the United States (Table IV) . .
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(b) Ear-marked gold (Table III) . . . . . . (Table II) On this price assumption the average level of imports immediately before the war would be worth rather less than $5 billion. American experts are expecting a considerably higher figure than this after the war, even as much as 50% higher, on account of the greatly increased activity of the American -industrial machine and its increased consumption of imported raw materials as soon as they are available in the required volume. The American view may perhaps be regarded as in part a reflection of the vivid consciousness of the need for maintaining domestic prosperity currently in evidence in the United States; for, as appears from period 1932-38 as a magnified reflection of changes in the level of U.S. industrial production, or rather, as it should be read in this context, in the level of internal prosperity. Whatever vicissitudes one may foresee for American prosperity, it is certain that the public demand for vigorous Government action to meet any serious or prolonged unemployment will be intense. When the outside world has recovered its capacity to supply, imports of $6 to $8 billion on the above price assumption would seem quite reasonable. U.S. imports averaged $4 billion in the decade 1920-29 at the prices and level of national income then prevailing. They are running currently in the neighbourhood of $5 billion at present prices. Exports, at the average level immediately before the war, on the same price assumption would be a little more than $6 billion. Here also the American experts expect a higher figure, various estimates up to as high as $10 billion being current. In the second half of 1945 American exports, which were still dominated by Lend-Lease, were running at an annual rate of $8 billion. . .
(c) Market Securities
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American statisticians are expecting a substantial increase in this adverse balance, and rely on this, more than on any other factor, for the maintenance of equilibrium. The pre-war adverse balance in respect of shipping may be reversed, but not perhaps by as much as some people think. The great increase of Americanowned tonnage is mainly concentrated in a few specialised types, and a very great part of it will, according to present plans, be scrapped, laid-up or otherwise disposed of. American costs, both of building and of running ships, are very high compared with our own. Overseas Government expenditure, on the other hand, will certainly be much greater.
American forecasters are, however, mainly influenced in reaching their conclusion by the expectation of a very great increase in tourist expenditure. Before the war their gross payments out on this ground were of the order of $300 million. It is believed that after the war this expenditure will reach at least $1 billion, and even such figures as $2 billion are spoken of. Those who know the present state of hotel accommodation here and in Europe are likely to consider these figures greatly over-estimated in the short run. But in the long run, if we take adequate measures to develop the tourist industry up to its full potentialities, this source of overseas income, both here and in Europe, may be very great. Moreover, even in the short run American tourist expenditure nearer home in Canada, Mexico and the West Indies may be substantial.
An important item to complete the balance-sheet of current receipts and expenditure still remains for examination-namely, the growth of income from the new foreign loans now in prospect. We start off with an estimate of net receipts of $300 million at the end of 1945 in respect of interest and dividend receipts.* It is the prospective increase in this item which looks most alarming to the outsider, and it is therefore particularly important to clear our minds about its possible order of magnitude in relation to the other figures in the balance-sheet.
An estimate of American commitments, actual and prospective, up to date has been given in the January Bank Letter of the National City Bank of New York as follows: 
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Ditto for Lend-Lease settlement, etc. There are far too many uncertainties in the position to allow of any clear-cut summing up. I am content to leave the reader to reach his own tentative conclusion in the light of the above. Very broadly, however, it looks as if the invisible balance of the United States on current account, including interest, is more likely to be adverse than favourable, and, if tourist traffic fulfils expectations, substantially adverse. For visible trade to assume an excess of exports over imports by as much as $2 to $3 billion as an average over a period of years allows, from the point of view of the outside world, a considerable, one should hope an excessive, measure of pessimism. If American Commercial Policy is successful in directing itself with any degree of conviction to the preservation of equilibrium in the overall balance of payments, the final outcome might be appreciably better than the above.
It may be worth while to record the experience of the United States after the last war. The U.S. balance of payments from 1924 to 1930 inclusive showed a -merchandise excess of almost $800 million a year on the average. But shipping and travelling expenditure cut the above favourable balance almost in half whilst cash remittances from the United States (no longer relatively so important to-day) almost eliminated the remainder; with the result that the next annual balance on capital account was not more than $100 million. We have seen above that foreign-owned liquid resources in the United States in the shape of ear-marked gold, bank balances and market securities amount to at least $15 billion. It appears from Table V that the more liquid resources are well spread between a number of countries. Nevertheless, the countries most needing dollars are not necessarily those holding the largest balances; and some of the countries with the largest amounts regard their dollar balances as part of their ultimate reserves (e.g., Canada) and are not likely to draw upon them fully except in extreme circumstances. Thus only a portion of the above aggregate can be regarded as easily available to cover a balance of payments favourable to the United States.
The New Projected Loans Themselves.
If we-omit from Table IX the contributions to U.N.R.R.A. and the credits for Lend-Lease settlements which have been already, or shortly will be, spent, we are left with a total of $13 billion; this will rise to $14-25 million if the Export-Import Bank's lending powers are increased, and it is presumably not the end, if we are looking five or ten years ahead.
Gold Reserves and Current Production.
The 1937 Putting one thing together with another, and after pondering all these figures, may not the reader feel himself justified in concluding that the chances of the dollar becoming dangerously scarce in the course of the next five to ten years are not very high 2 I found some American authorities thinking it at least as likely that America will lose gold in the early future as that she will gain a significant quantity. Indeed, the contrary view is s.o widely held, on the basis (I believe) of mere impression, that it would be a surprising thing if it turns out right.
In the long run more fundamental forces may be at work, if all goes well, tending towards equilibrium, the significance of which may ultimately transcend ephemeral statistics. I find myself mQ'ved, not for the first time, to remind contemporary economists that the classical teaching embodied some permanent truths of great significance, which we are liable to-day to overlook because we associate them with other doctrines which we cannot now accept without much qualification. There are in these matters deep undercurrents at work, natural forces, one can-call them, or ev'en the invisible hand, which are operating towards equilibrium. If it were not so, we could not have got on even so well as we have for many decades past. The United States is becoming a high-living, high-cost country beyond any previous experience. Unless their internal, as well as their external, economic life is to become paralysed by the Midas touch, they will discover ways of life which, compared with the ways of the less fortunate regions of the world, must tend towards, and not away from, external equilibrium.
Admittedly, if the classical medicine is to work, it is essential that import tariffs and export subsidies should not progressively 186 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [JUNE offset its influence. It is for this reason that one is entitled to draw some provisional comfort from the present mood of the American Administration and, as I judge it, of the American people also, as embodied in the Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment. We have here sincere and thoroughgoing proposals, advanced on behalf of the United States, expressly directed towards creating a system which allows the classical medicine to do its work. It shows how much modernist stuff, gone wrong and turned sour and silly, is circulating in our system, also incongruously mixed, it seems, with age-old poisons, that we should have given so doubtful a welcome to this magnificent, objective approach which a few years ago we should have regarded as offering incredible promise of a better scheme of things. I must not be misunderstood. I do not suppose that the classical medicine will work by itself or that we can depend on it. We need quicker and less painful aids of which exchange variation and overall import control are the most important. But in the long run these expedients will work better and we shall need them less, if the classical medicine is also at work. And if we reject the medicine from our systems altogether, we may just drift on from expedient to expedient and never get really fit again. The great virtue of the Bretton Woods and Washington proposals, taken in conjunction, is that they marry the use of the necessary expedients to the wholesome long-run doctrine. It is for this reason that, speaking in the House of Lords, I claimed that " Here is an attempt to use what we have learnt from modern experience and modern analysis, not to defeat, but to implement the wisdom of Adam Smith."
No one can be certain of anything in this age of flux and change. Decaying standards of life at a time when our command over the production of material satisfactions is the greatest ever, and a diminishing scope for individual decision and choice at a time when more than before we should be able to afford these satisfactions, are sufficient to indicate an underlying contradiction in every department of our economy. No planswill work for certain in such an epoch. But if they palpably fail, then, of course, we and everyone else will try something different.
Meanwhile for us the best policy is to act on the optimistic hypothesis until it has been proved wrong. We shall do well not to fear the future too much. Preserving all due caution in our own activities, the job for us is to get through the next five years in conditions which are favourable and not unfavourable to the
